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Competition policy issues in mobile network sharing:  
a European perspective 
Zoltán Pápai - Gergely Csorba - Péter Nagy - Aliz McLean 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Network sharing agreements have become increasingly widespread in mobile 
telecommunications markets. They carry undeniable advantages to operators and consumers 
alike, but also the potential for consumer harm. We emphasize that not all NSAs are created 
equal: the assessment of harms and counterweighing benefits to customers due to an NSA is 
a complex endeavour. In this paper, we present a framework for the competitive assessment 
of NSAs, detailing the possible concerns that may arise, the main factors that influence their 
seriousness, ways to mitigate the concerns and the principles of assessing efficiency benefits. 
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A mobil hálózatmegosztás versenypolitikai kérdéseiről: 
európai körkép 
Pápai Zoltán, Csorba Gergely, Nagy Péter és McLean Aliz  
 
Összefoglaló 
 
A mobilpiacokon egyre elterjedtebbé válnak a hálózatmegosztási megállapodások. Ezek a 
megállapodások érdemi előnyökkel járnak a szolgáltatók és a fogyasztók számára, 
ugyanakkor felvethetnek versenypolitikai aggályokat is. Minden hálózatmegosztás különböző, 
és ezért az előnyök és hátrányok elemzése és összemérése komplex feladat. Ebben a 
tanulmányban egy elemzési keretet adunk a hálózatmegosztási megállapodások 
versenypolitikai értékelésére, sorba vesszük azokat a mérlegelésnél fontos tényezőket, az 
aggályok kezelésének lehetséges módjait, illetve a hatékonysági előnyök számbavételének 
alapelveit.  
 
JEL: K21, L13, L41 
 
Tárgyszavak: mobilpiacok, hálózatmegosztás, verseny, versenyelemzés 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile network sharing is a type of cooperation between mobile network operators to jointly 
use, maintain, and build some of the network inputs required for their operations. Since the 
parties are direct competitors, the concern emerges that these agreements could potentially 
lead to a restriction of competition. However, the European Commission and various 
national competition authorities have previously regarded such agreements as favourable 
alternatives to mergers. This was not the case from the very beginning. In the early years of 
3G network development, only passive sharing was accepted (and encouraged) between 
mobile operators, with the notable exception of Sweden.1 By the time 4G arrived on the 
market, active network sharing agreements (NSAs) emerged in many EU countries as a way 
of reducing the costs of building and operating new (as well as older) generation networks, 
enhancing coverage, and speeding up the rollout of networks.  
Nowadays network sharing is a widespread phenomenon, though it still has not become 
mainstream. Its cost and efficiency advantages are clear, but these agreements are 
encumbered by the required serious and long-term engagement between parties with 
potentially divergent strategies and interests. Competition authorities and industry 
regulators may also scrutinise this kind of cooperation between rivals, as it may restrict 
competition. A network sharing agreement therefore both carries great potential for 
efficiencies and may raise competition concerns. 
Network sharing can be a viable strategy in closing the gap between high and increasing 
network building and operating costs and stagnating or only slowly growing revenues. Mobile 
networks providing voice, data and IoT services have become more complex than ever before. 
Sharing therefore provides a great potential for cost efficiency but also poses a serious 
assessment challenge, especially for the coming 5G era.  
This paper presents a general framework for the competition policy assessment of active 
mobile network sharing agreements, building on the approach laid out in guidelines by the 
European Commission and European regulators, as well as competition cases in European 
jurisdictions. Chapter 2 provides a general introduction to network sharing: its history, its 
main types, the motivations behind it, and a brief literature review. We also give an overview 
of all current network sharing agreements in Europe, and group them according to various 
dimensions. Chapter 3 defines the relevant markets affected by network sharing and 
introduces our analytical framework. Chapter 4 details the possible anticompetitive concerns 
regarding NSAs, while Chapter 5 briefly discusses the efficiencies that they may result in. 
Chapter 6 concludes. 
                                                        
1 Mölleryd et al. (2014) 
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2. NETWORK SHARING AGREEMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION 
Network sharing is a means of cooperation to economise on the cost of providing better 
networks. Although the aim is simple, the implementation can take many forms. The 
differences between the real-world cases stem mostly from different answers to three basic 
questions: where, what, and with whom.  
 “Where” refers to the geographic dimension of the coverage, which can be the whole 
country, or a larger or smaller part of it.  
 “What” is more complex, because it refers to the depth of the agreement: the network 
elements, the technology and sometimes the spectrum involved in the network 
sharing. It may involve the passive infrastructure (sites or masts), the radio access 
network (RAN) or, theoretically at least, some part of the core network. It may 
concern one of the currently active generations of mobile technology like 2G, 3G, or 
4G, or any combination of these. And the agreements can cover specific bands of 
spectrum, or the entirety of the operators’ spectrum endowments. 
 The third question, “with whom” to share with, is also key, as not all players provide a 
good “fit”:  motives, inclinations and incentives can vary significantly.  
2.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF NETWORK SHARING 
In order to understand the differences between and the motives behind existing agreements, 
it is useful to look at the short history of network sharing. 
The sharing of sites and masts (the passive network) was present on mobile markets from 
the very beginning, i.e. from the 2G era. It was either commercially motivated or induced by 
regulations. It occurred mostly on a site-by-site basis, at high-cost and/or low-traffic sites 
where it was uneconomical or impossible to duplicate the passive infrastructure. These 
agreements had more of a supplementary nature, and, but helped provide larger and more 
consistent coverage in a cost-efficient way and did not really raise competition concerns.2 
Another early type of network sharing was national roaming: one operator would provide 
mobile services to the other operator’s customers under a wholesale agreement. The roaming 
provider shared its resources between its own customers and the other’s. The relationship 
was generally asymmetric: the network did not become common, and the buyer had no 
control over the parameters of the service. National roaming was also partly commercial 
motivated, but also often encouraged or even mandated by regulators; it was used in many 
                                                        
2 See for example cases investigated by the European Commission: COMP/38.370 O2 UK Limited/T-
Mobile UK Limited and COMP/38.369 T-Mobile Deutschland/O2 Germany. These agreements also 
concerned national roaming, discussed in the next paragraph. 
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countries to support new entrants by providing them with network services (2G, 3G) till they 
rolled out their own network. 
When operators paid huge amounts for 3G spectrum licenses and were obliged to provide 
the fast deployment and high coverage detailed in the license terms, sharing the deployment 
and operational costs with another network operator suddenly seemed very attractive. In the 
first half of the 2000s, 3G appeared to be an expensive, risky investment: there were neither 
adequate devices for consumers, nor any lucrative new services to offer them, and the 
technology was still premature. Moreover, providing coverage on the 2100 MHz spectrum 
required more base stations than the 2G did on the 900 or even the 1800 MHz band. At the 
same time, active network sharing was explicitly or implicitly proscribed in the license terms 
in most European countries. Where it was not explicitly banned, however, economic 
necessity and the shared interests of the MNOs triggered the first active network sharing 
agreements, a deeper form of cooperation than what had occurred before.  
This so-called active radio network (RAN) sharing first appeared in Sweden, approved by 
the regulator in 2002,3 and became ever more widely used. It was evident by the end of the 
first decade of the 21st century that rural coverage was too costly to provide and faster 
network deployment and especially close to 100% coverage could be better and more 
efficiently provided by using a common active network, and not just common sites, at least in 
the highest costing areas. 
2.2 WAYS OF NETWORK SHARING 
While passive network sharing involved the common use of sites and masts, active network 
sharing implies that in addition, the radio access network is also shared in some way, 
resulting in the RAN being operated as a common element of the operators’ networks. In this 
case the parties share all the access network elements to the point of connection with the core 
network. At this point, each operator sends the traffic from its respective customers onto its 
own core for processing by its own core network elements and infrastructure.4 RAN sharing 
usually and rationally implies the sharing of backhaul and transport to the interconnection 
point of operators’ separate core networks. In addition to the above, spectrum or even some 
core network activities can be shared between the parties. These different options of active 
network sharing imply different depths of technical and business cooperation.  
                                                        
3 See Mölleryd et al. (2014). The incumbent failed to secure any 3G spectrum itself, and this placed 
pressure on the regulator to approve RAN sharing.  
4 See GSMA (2012a). 
 
 
8 
 
It is important to note that although active sharing implies the common use and 
operation of the radio equipment, as a default it does not involve spectrum sharing. Based on 
this distinction, we differentiate between three distinct types of active sharing.5 
 MORAN (Multi-Operator Radio Access Network) is the case where each operator uses 
its own spectrum with a common RAN. 
 MOCN (Multi-Operator Core Network) denotes the case when beside the RAN a 
specific spectrum band is shared and used together. Even in this latter case the core 
network is still separate.  
 RAN sharing and partial sharing of the core.6 
The core network, which is the very essence of service provision and differentiation, 
consists of the core transmission ring, and the core functionalities providing user 
authentication, switching, logical service assignments, billing, etc. to all of the operator’s own 
retail or wholesale customers.7 Sharing resources induces similarity in these features of the 
operators’ services. While MORAN does not affect service parameters except for those related 
to coverage, in the MOCN case the two operators’ customers are served by the common radio 
carrier, so their experience concerning the radio quality parameters is more similar. But even 
with the partial sharing of the core, service differentiation still remains mostly under the 
control of the respective operators.8 As far as practical relevance is concerned, the NSAs in 
Europe are predominantly MORAN. To our knowledge, no sharing deeper than MOCN has 
emerged so far, so our analysis will deal only with MORAN and MOCN agreements.  
2.3 MOTIVATIONS BEHIND NETWORK SHARING 
We have already briefly touched on the subject of why network sharing makes business sense. 
While the motives and incentives are manifold, some typical scenarios can be identified.9 We 
list four of these here.  
1. The fast and efficient roll-out of a new network and its cost-efficient operation 
This was the main motive of cooperation in the shared deployment of new 3G, and 
later 4G networks, and will most probably arise in 5G networks as well. Building a 
new network together facilitates deployment and may result in somewhat better (in 
terms of signal quality) and larger coverage; both capital and operating cost savings 
may be significant. Such an NSA is easier to implement for the parties in cases where 
their position is to some extent symmetric, and the gains from cost savings are 
                                                        
5 The categorisation is based on the standards laid down by 3GPP. See BIPT (2012) for a good 
discussion. 
6 This is technically feasible using the GWCN (Gateway Core Network) sharing architecture. 
7 See GSMA (2012a). 
8 We discuss the issue of differentiation in detail in Chapter 4.1.1. 
9 See GSMA (2012a), Mölleryd et al (2014), OECD (2014), Neumann and Plückebaum (2017). 
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similar. Some examples of such agreements are those between all four mobile 
operators in France (and especially between SFR and Bouygues), between Telenor 
and Hutchison in Sweden, and between T-Mobile and Hutchison in the UK. 
2. Gaining access to spectrum 
Another motivation behind an NSA is where one party does not have the spectrum it 
desperately needs to remain competitive. The other party has enough spectrum but 
may be seeking to save on costs through the shared deployment and operation of a 
network. Such deals are usually reached between asymmetric parties, and as such, 
they are less widespread and not necessarily stable. However, the first 3G network 
sharing in Sweden fits into this category, where the incumbent Telia did not win any 
3G spectrum, but had the resources to build the new network, while Tele2 was 
presumably happy to share in the financial risk and the cost of the new network. 
Another example is the later prohibited agreement between Yoigo and Telefónica in 
Spain. 
3. Reducing the operating costs of old networks  
Already built old (2G, and later 3G) networks can be more efficiently operated as a 
common network. If two players cooperate in rolling-out a new network (earlier 3G, 
then 4G), it is only logical to consider the joint operation of the old ones. An 
additional gain from the cooperation is that coverage and other qualities of old 
networks can be improved on the margin, with a much lower burden on the individual 
parties than in the standalone case. Agreements between Telia and Telenor in 
Denmark, Orange and T-Mobile in Poland, and O2 and T-Mobile in the Czech 
Republic are examples of this rationale. 
4. Fulfilling license commitments 
Network sharing agreements are sometimes established in order to cover the high 
cost of reaching sparsely populated and/or remote areas, whose coverage formed part 
of parties’ license commitments. These agreements cover only rural areas, such as the 
Vodafone/Orange NSA in Spain, the Vodafone/Wind Hellas cooperation in Greece, or 
the agreement between Teliasonera and DNA in Finland. 
2.4 NSAS IN EUROPE 
Looking at the European countries where mobile network sharing agreements are in place at 
the time of writing (mid-2018), we find that these agreements differ widely with respect to 
their geographic coverage, the spectrum and technologies involved, the depth of the network 
activities shared and also the economic organisational forms of the sharing. As each 
dimension can affect the possible competition concerns we discuss them all briefly. Figure 2.1 
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presents a non-exhaustive typology of currently functioning mobile network sharing 
agreements. 
Figure 1 
 NSAs in the European Union 
Geographic Scope    
Whole country 
SE 2002 3G | 4 | 1+2 |* 
RO 2016 4G | 4 | 1+3                                        
UK 2007 4G/3G | 5 | 4+5 
SE 2011 4G/2G | 4 | 2+3 |* 
CY 2016 4G/3G | 3 | 2+3 
PL 2011 4G/3G/2G | 4 | 1+3|* 
DK 2012 4G/3G/2G | 4 | 2+3|* 
UK 2012 4G/3G/2G | 4 | 2+3   
IT 2017 4G/3G/2G | 4 | 1+4 
Large part of the 
country, except some 
densely populated 
areas 
SE 2002 3G | 4 | 3+4                                               
HU 2015 4G (800) | 3 | 1+2|* 
  CZ 2011 4G/3G/2G | 3 | 1+2 
Only rural FR 2015 3G | 4 | 1+2+3+4 
ES 2009 3G/2G | 4 | 2+3 
GR 2013 3G/2G | 3 | 2+3 
FR 2014 4G/3G/2G | 4 | 2+3                                                   
FI 2014 4G/3G/2G | 3 | 2+3 |* 
How many RAN 
technology 
generations are 
involved? 
1 2 3 
      key: Country #Start date #Technology generation | #No of MNOs | #Rank of the parties |*MOCN or both 
 
The vertical dimension of the figure refers to the geographic scope and the horizontal to 
the number of technologies involved. Further information is provided about each agreement 
in the boxes, to provide insight into other factors, such as the year the sharing began, the 
generations of mobile technology involved, the number of commercially active, independent 
mobile operators on the market, and the rank of the NSA participants by size.10 
The figure shows that many agreements cover all three currently active generations of 
network technology, or at least two of them. As far as geographic coverage is concerned, a 
majority of agreements cover the whole country. With one exception (France), agreements 
were reached between two parties. Most of the existing agreements are MORAN, a few 
MOCN or MORAN for some bands and MOCN for others. Overall, it seems network sharing 
is not a “one size fits all” type of cooperation. 
2.5 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Network sharing is widely discussed in industry forums as a viable form of consolidation 
besides mergers, see for example Mölleryd et al (2014) and Neumann and Plückebaum 
                                                        
10 Rankings are usually based on the number of subscribers on the retail market, as these are more 
easily and widely available than the alternative metric, annual mobile revenue. 
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(2017) for nice summaries. Surprisingly, however, there are very few academic articles 
explicitly exploring the incentives and competitive impact of network sharing.  
The only theoretical article we know of is Motta and Tarantino (2017), where the starting 
point is the detailed theoretical modelling of horizontal mergers in environments where the 
operators compete both in price and investment. Their main finding is that without 
substantial efficiency gains, these mergers will reduce aggregate investment and harm 
consumers, if one compares the merger to the benchmark of no merger happening. Then they 
study network sharing as an alternative to a full-scale merger, where they model the NSA like 
the classical models of R&D cooperation: firms first decide on investments to maximise joint 
profit but then individually set their prices. With this comparison, they show that these types 
of NSAs perform better from a consumer welfare point of view than mergers. 
We are aware of one article that aimed to quantitatively evaluate the economic effects of 
network sharing. Song et al (2012) provide estimates on cost savings and price developments 
for various network sharing alternatives in South Korea, and calculate changes in consumer 
and producer surpluses under some simplifying assumptions. However, they concentrate 
only on the changes in the resulting welfare measures without explicitly studying the changes 
in incentives and the impact on competition. 
In the last decade, several regulatory authorities have also published summaries or 
guidelines on network sharing. The Body of European Regulators for Electronic 
Communications (BEREC) discussed network sharing in two documents. The first one, 
published together with Radio Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG) in 2011 summarises the 
answers European national regulatory authorities (NRAs) gave concerning some important 
issues such as of the scope and scale and cost reduction potential of the sharing agreements, 
their innovative forms, competition issues and governance models.11 The document also 
presents a non-exhaustive list of points might be considered when assessing the potential 
distortion or restriction of competition due to a sharing agreement. 
After 7 years, in 2018 BEREC consulted again with the NRAs and published a report on 
infrastructure sharing, in which it describes the various existing sharing models by classifying 
them according to how deeply the network is shared (passive and/or active infrastructure and 
spectrum).12 It briefly discusses the legal framework and the regulations in place relating to 
agreements on infrastructure sharing, their geographic scope, time frame, the included 
technologies (2G, 3G, 4G), the type of the agreement (such as joint ventures or leases), its 
commercial and regulatory drivers, and also their benefits and potential challenges. The 
report also provides information on the formal or informal assessment of some cases.  
                                                        
11 BEREC (2011). 
12 BEREC (2018). 
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A report by the OECD (2014) examines many advantages and disadvantages to network 
sharing both from the operators’ and the consumers’ perspective. The report makes use of 
competition policy categorisations of potential competition concerns such as unilateral 
effects, potential coordination and information sharing. 
Among the national regulators' publications, the Belgian regulator’s and two French 
authorities' guidelines provide useful summaries and information.  
The document on network sharing published by the Belgian regulator in 2012 discusses 
the main concepts, the types of sharing architectures and the pros and cons of sharing, and 
provides a guideline to infrastructure sharing for MNOs.13 One of the main messages found 
therein is that a sharing which gives an operator independence in controlling all important 
elements of the service provision is acceptable from a competition point of view. Therefore, a 
MORAN-type agreement where the operator can fully control the radio access network is 
preferred to an MOCN. 
L’Autorité de la Concurrence, the French competition authority published an opinion in 
2013 on network sharing and internal roaming.14 According to the authority’s opinion, 
sharing is more beneficial in sparsely populated high-cost areas, but even in these places it 
has to be justified because of its potential to diminish competition. In the most densely 
populated areas, the potential restrictive effects of RAN sharing may be too large because of 
the need for more information exchange between the partners, while the cost savings are 
lower. In these areas, an efficiency justification is needed, and maintaining the ability to 
differentiate is especially important.  
ARCEP, the French telecommunications and postal regulator published its guideline on 
network sharing in 2016, and also took a fairly tough stance on the matter.15 The document 
discusses the pros and cons of the geographic dimensions of network sharing. It concludes 
that network sharing is welfare enhancing and beneficial in sparsely populated and high-cost 
areas, potentially harmful to investment and innovation in densely populated areas, and 
somewhere in between otherwise. According to the guideline, passive infrastructure sharing 
should be encouraged throughout entire territories; active sharing may be relevant in certain 
areas, provided that the negative impact on regulatory objectives can be offset by the positive 
impact, particularly sufficient benefits to users; and the pooling of frequencies (i.e. MOCN) 
should be limited to sparsely populated areas.16 
                                                        
13 BIPT (2012). 
14 L’Autorité de la Concurrence (2013). 
15 ARCEP (2016). 
16 ARCEP (2016) 
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While these policy documents are informative, they only discuss competition issues very 
generally, and do not focus on providing guidance on the competition assessment of the 
theories of harm in real-life cases, which we develop in this paper. 
3. AFFECTED MARKETS AND OUR ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
In any competition policy assessment, it is one of the first steps to define the relevant 
markets that might be affected by the business conduct in question. In this chapter, we 
outline the main questions to consider when forming the conceptual framework to analyse 
NSAs.  
The principal question of the competitive assessment is how the different aspects of the 
agreement will impact competition from the perspective of the MNOs’ final customers, that 
is, at the retail level of mobile telecommunication services.  
3.1 THE PRODUCT AND GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DIMENSIONS OF MOBILE 
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES 
First, we need to consider the boundaries of the relevant markets. To our knowledge, all 
previous competition policy and regulatory analyses in mobile telecommunications markets 
have considered the geographical scope of the markets to be national, and this was not 
contested by any interested parties. We agree with this assessment and shall not discuss the 
geographic dimension any further. The product market dimension of retail mobile 
telecommunication services is more ambiguous. The most important question is whether 
certain segments of the mobile telecommunication services form distinct relevant product 
markets or not. These questions have been raised during the assessment of several recent 
merger cases, but a final conclusion was always that the relevant market was the retail 
market for mobile telecommunications services.17 
An obvious separation exists between mobile voice and data (also called mobile internet). 
However, there may be a need for further differentiation, based on the services typically 
offered to different customer groups. These are the following:  
1. Voice service: standalone mobile voice service (including, of course, text messages) for 
customers (typically non-smartphone users) who require this service only. 
2. Large-screen (LS) service: standalone mobile data service for customers (typically 
laptop and tablet users) who require this service only. 
                                                        
17 See M.5650 – T-Moblie/Orange; M.6497 – Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria; M.6992 – 
Hutchison 3G UK/Telefónica Ireland; M.7018 – Telefónica Deutschland/E-Plus; M.7499 – 
Altice/PT Portugal; M.7612 – Hutchison 3G UK/Telefónica UK; M.7637 – Liberty Global/BASE 
Belgium; M.7758 – Hutchison 3G Italy/Wind/JV; M.7978 – Vodafone/Liberty Global/Dutch JV; 
M.8131 – Tele2 Sverige/TDC Sverige. 
 
 
 
14 
 
3. Small-screen (SS) service: mobile voice and mobile data service offered in a package 
to smartphone users. 
4. Machine to machine (M2M) service: data communication between machines. This 
mostly narrowband communication can take place in the form of SMS or mobile data 
services. 
For both the voice and data segment (separately or taken together), there is a possible 
sub-segmentation in services offered to residential or business customers and/or for the 
prepaid or postpaid customers. Furthermore, data services can be also sub-segmented based 
on their speed. 
It is important that the technological scope of the NSA can also influence the market 
definition process. For example, if an active NSA covers only the spectrum and corresponding 
RAN used mostly for data services, then the market that needs to be assessed might be 
restricted to mobile data services, at least as a starting point. At the other extreme, if the NSA 
concerns full grid consolidation, then all product segments need to be considered (separately 
or together).  
Finally, there is the question of whether there is viable competitive pressure from fixed 
telecommunication services towards mobile telecommunication services, that is, whether the 
relevant market should be defined more broadly. Although in some segments (especially in 
data services) it is technically possible for fixed services to offer an alternative to the 
respective mobile service, there does not seem to be a serious enough indication for 
competitive pressure coming from this direction.18 Therefore, this possibility has not been 
seriously discussed in previous cases, and we do not expect that to change in the next few 
years. 
The discussion above highlights that quite a few market definition issues may arise in 
actual cases, posing a significant analytical burden. Fortunately, however, in most cases it is 
not necessary to arrive at a definite conclusion regarding the boundaries of the relevant 
markets, as the competitive assessment would likely be similar given any reasonable market 
definition. This is because most MNOs offer a full range of mobile services, and it is quite rare 
that one MNO has a much stronger market presence in one segment than in another.  
Therefore, in the following discussion we work with the loose definition of a market for 
mobile services at the retail level, without specifying whether it is sub-segmented into smaller 
relevant markets. 
 
                                                        
18 Furthermore, even if the market were larger, the parties engaged in the NSA would likely still be 
closer competitors to each other; therefore, the competitive assessment would not change 
dramatically. 
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3.2 THE VERTICAL DIMENSIONS OF MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATION MARKETS 
NSAs may concern many different elements of the mobile infrastructure and the relationship 
of the various infrastructures and markets is much more complex than in typical competition 
policy cases. It is therefore important to put together an analytical framework for the 
illustration of how network elements and services and markets build upon each other. 
The following figure presents the relevant vertical levels and their connections in a 
general manner. The black arrows show connections within the company that can be 
interpreted as internal services. The dashed arrows show transactions with external 
operators; these connections mark the affected markets that are analysed later in our study. 
Figure 2 
 Mobile telecommunication markets 
 
 
We divide the vertical chain of mobile telecommunication services into three (not entirely 
distinct) levels. A classical integrated Mobile Network Operator (MNO) is active at all three 
levels. 
1. ("Production level") The production of wholesale mobile services using various 
network inputs, equipment and services.  
2. ("Wholesale level") The sale of the wholesale mobile services produced by the 
MNO to Mobile Service Providers (MSPs). These MSPs can be other integrated 
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MNOs (for example in the case of roaming services) or Virtual Mobile Network 
Operators (MVNOs). 
3. ("Retail level") The provision of retail mobile services, where the Mobile Retail 
Service Provider develops the retail service packages by potentially adding quality 
features to the wholesale mobile service purchased from the MNO, then sells to 
the final customers and takes care of marketing, billing and customer relations. 
As it can be seen on the graph, the “Production level” and the “Wholesale level” overlap to 
some extent: the core network may form part of either or rather both, as we discuss below. 
We can further divide the production level of mobile services into several levels, 
corresponding to different network elements (inputs). In this case, also, the boundaries 
between these elements are not always straightforward, but they are usually mentioned 
separately. Additionally, there is not always a strict one-way vertical relationship between the 
levels, but as we go down the "production line" dictated by technological sequencing, 
additional complementary network inputs and services are used. In the case of an integrated 
MNO, these complementary inputs / services typically arrive from within the firm, but at 
some levels the inputs can be procured from external sources and also provided to other 
network operators. These latter transactions will define additional markets we might look at 
in our competitive assessment. 
1. Passive radio infrastructure network: these are sites, towers and antenna support 
structures on the roofs of buildings, including their maintenance and operation. In 
addition to the service provided within the integrated MNO, external transactions also 
take place at this level. According to current market practice, mobile operators 
frequently give each other access to their own passive infrastructure; in several 
countries existing regulations even require them to do so under certain conditions.  
2. Radio spectrum: this input, or more correctly its usage rights are typically acquired by 
the MNO at spectrum awarding procedures. However, in Europe and in several other 
regulatory environments it has also become possible to trade spectrum between 
MNOs on the secondary market. 
3. Radio access network (RAN): providing the radio access service requires various 
network elements (antennae, radio and other instruments) for the productive use of 
the previous two inputs (passive infrastructure and spectrum). This is the level where 
the so-called active network begins. In most countries, RAN services are typically 
supplied only internally, so there is no connecting market.  
4. Transmission network: this provides the connection between various elements of the 
active network. There is a usual separation between two depths of transmission 
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(backhaul and backbone), although the boundaries between the two are not 
unambiguous. 
5. Core network: this is the intelligent part of the mobile network where the production 
of the (wholesale) mobile service is completed by using the above inputs, and where 
the differentiating features of the service are added to satisfy the needs of the various 
retail entities (the integrated MNO’s own Mobile Retail Service Provider, MVNOs, or 
the MRSP of another integrated MNO) that are in direct connection with the end 
consumers by producing mobile services for users.19 If we consider the core network 
provider as a separate entity, we get the central actor of the wholesale level. Note that 
in some countries there exists a type of MVNO (the so-called full MVNO) that has its 
own core network as well as connecting to the MNO’s core.  
3.3 SCOPE AND IMPACT OF NSAS IN THIS FRAMEWORK 
In this section, we provide an example of how the above framework can be used to illustrate 
an NSA and the depth of cooperation between the MNOs. The figure below shows an example 
of partial MOCN active sharing: the parties share parts of their passive infrastructure, their 
spectrum (e.g. the spectrum for the 4G network), and the corresponding RAN and 
transmission, but not their core. A similar graph can be drawn for cases where spectrum is 
not shared (like in case of MORAN), or when the sharing extends to all technologies and all 
spectra (full network consolidation). The sharing could either be partial in its geographical 
scope, e.g. pertaining only to rural areas, or national, covering the whole country, or 
somewhere in between.  
In all forms of NSAs, it is important to note that the cooperation does not cover the 
mobile services offered at the retail or at the wholesale level; they only concern some aspects 
of the "production" of the mobile service. Therefore, we think it best to characterise NSAs as 
production agreements and provide their competitive assessment along these lines. 
The second important feature worth remembering is that even the widest NSA (full 
network consolidation) does not result in full-scale cooperation at the production level. The 
core network of the production phase remains independent. This feature is crucial to 
consider, as the core network is the intelligent part of the production process, where the 
majority of the differentiation of services offered to consumers takes place. 
 
                                                        
19 The provision of interconnection services (IC) that establish connection with other networks also 
belongs to the provider of the core network.  
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Figure 3 
An example of network sharing 
 
4. POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE CONCERNS REGARDING NSAS 
In this chapter, we discuss the potential competition policy concerns (so-called theories of 
harm) that may arise in connection to network sharing agreements and give a short summary 
of the arguments for and against them.  
Since an NSA is an agreement between direct competitors, the natural starting point of 
any competition policy assessment is the framework established for horizontal agreements. 
The Horizontal Guidelines issued by the European Commission in 2010 presents the legal 
and economic arguments to be considered; we follow its structure.20 The assessment consists 
of two successive steps:21 
1. First, one must assess whether the agreement may have any restrictive effects and 
thus breach Article 101(1) of the European Treaty. The burden of proof for 
establishing negative effects lies with the competition authority. This is the step we 
discuss in this chapter. 
                                                        
20 European Commission (2011). 
21 European Commission (2011), paragraph 20. 
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2. Secondly, if competitive concerns are substantiated in the first step, then the 
assessment of the efficiency benefits of the agreement becomes relevant. Should these 
positive effects outweigh the negative effects, then the agreement may be exempt 
(Article 101(3)). The burden of proof connected to efficiency benefits lies with the 
parties to the agreement. We will discuss this part in the Chapter 5. 
We make a few general observations regarding the process of evaluation:  
 All concerns are assessed separately in all affected product and geographic markets. 
The methods used are very similar in each case, but the results could differ; it is 
therefore possible that a concern is substantiated only in one type of geographical 
area, or a specific segment of the product market.  
 The market power of the parties to the NSA can substantially affect whether a concern 
arises, and thus their market power should be analysed thoroughly – above and 
beyond simply checking parties’ market shares. Further, market power may differ at 
various vertical levels and must be evaluated at the level appropriate to the specific 
competition concern. 
 Since all national mobile telecommunications markets feature oligopolistic structures 
with few (practically 3 or 4) integrated competitors at the retail level, seemingly small 
differences can be important in the assessment. 
 A key expression in the case of all concerns is change: markets may be more or less 
competitive at the outset, but the assessment must concentrate on what the NSA itself 
directly changes, compared to the appropriate counterfactual: the expected (future) 
situation on the market without the NSA.  
As the focus of an NSA is the sharing of production assets, it can be characterised as a 
production agreement. Chapter 4 of the Horizontal Guidelines deals specifically with these 
types of agreements, so we discuss the potential concerns raised therein. The theories of 
harm can be grouped into three main categories: 
1. The agreement could decrease each involved party's individual incentive to compete, 
and therefore could result in a loss of rivalry between the parties.22 Following the 
classical terminology used in merger cases, we refer to these concerns as unilateral 
(or non-coordinated) horizontal effects. 
Note that just because both parties' behaviour can change because of the agreement 
(and likely in the same direction), as long as the effect in question follows from 
changed individual incentives and not from any (tacit) collusion, it is a non-
coordinated effect.  
                                                        
22 European Commission (2011), paragraph 157. 
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2. The agreement could lead to a qualitative change on the market such that tacit 
collusion becomes easier, more stable or more effective on the market.23 Again, 
following merger terminology, we refer to these concerns as coordinative horizontal 
effects. 
In our view, the Horizontal Guidelines uses slightly misleading language concerning 
the scope of collusion, as it usually refers only to collusion between the parties to the 
agreement. However, in other competition policy guidelines, especially concerning 
mergers where the theory of collusion is more firmly established, collusion is always 
discussed as taking place between all major market players in the relevant market.24 
The economic theory of Industrial Organization providing the conceptual framework 
of coordinated effects also deals predominantly with models of full collusion, as one 
major player not involved in the collusion would seriously jeopardise its effectivity.25 
Therefore, we think that the correct assessment of the coordinated effects of an NSA 
should analyse its impact on tacit collusion between all major operators, not just 
between the parties to the NSA. 
3. The agreement could change the ability and / or the incentive of any party involved in 
the NSA to make access to an element of its mobile network infrastructure or service 
impossible or more expensive for competitors, which could indirectly have a harmful 
effect on the retail market.26 These exclusionary concerns will be referred to as 
vertical effects. 
These vertical effects could arise due to the changed individual incentives of the 
parties regarding access.27 
Table 1 shows a list of competition concerns that we will discuss one by one in the rest of 
this chapter, including one type that cannot be easily fit into the classic framework: the unfair 
competitive advantage.  
The crucial question to evaluate for each theory of harm is how competition and 
consumers will be impacted at the lowest vertical level where the parties are still active, that 
is, on the retail market for mobile services.  
 
                                                        
23 European Commission (2011), paragraph 158. 
24 See European Commission (2004, 2008). 
25 See Motta (2004), especially Chapter 4. 
26 European Commission (2011), paragraph 159. 
27 To our knowledge, there is neither a theoretical model not a real competition policy case in which 
an agreement made collusion on jointly refusing access possible or more effective, so we do not deal 
with potential coordinated vertical effects; we therefore simply omit the unilateral label here. 
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Table 1 
List of competition concerns 
 
Horizontal unilateral effects 
Decrease in incentives to compete due to 
the decreased differentiation of services 
between parties 
Decrease in incentives to compete due to 
fixed costs becoming variable 
Horizontal coordinative effects 
Increased commonality of costs 
Information exchange 
Vertical effects 
Access to MNOs to passive infrastructure 
Wholesale access to MVNOs to the 
operators’ network 
Unfair competitive advantage 
Potential exclusion of operators not party 
to the NSA 
Excessive concentration of spectrum 
 
4.1 UNILATERAL HORIZONTAL EFFECTS 
4.1.1 The decrease in differentiation 
One of the first potential concerns that can occur to competition authorities and/or 
regulators is that due to the NSA, certain aspects of the operators’ services will become more 
similar to each other, their technical autonomy will decrease and the possibility (and/or 
incentive) to differentiate will also decrease.28 The loss of differentiation might imply a loss of 
competition.  
This statement in itself is too general, and we need to specify what aspects of the services 
could be affected, and to what degree. Operators’ services differ from each other in many 
ways; here is a tentative list: price, marketing strategies, range of services, data allowance, 
speed, quality, coverage. Some of these differences are related to the radio network, like 
coverage, some are dependent on the quality and quantity of spectrum used, and others are 
the result of the capabilities of and the settings in the core.  
                                                        
28 See L’Autorité de la Concurrence (2013) as an example of this concern being raised. 
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We emphasise four general points that need to be considered when evaluating the 
potential change in differentiation:  
1. All active network sharing proposals we have seen so far (be they of the MORAN or 
MOCN type) involve the RAN (and the corresponding backhaul and transmission) 
only and leave the core network unaffected and therefore independent. This is 
important as the main differentiation of mobile services happens in the core network. 
2. It is worth distinguishing between technical and commercial differentiation. 
Technical differentiation consists of setting and managing service parameters, service 
access and usage rights, authentication, and network resource allocation to the 
individual customers. Technical differentiation occurs mostly in the core, and many 
aspects of it are not visible to customers. Commercial differentiation is often – but not 
always – based on technical differentiation. However, many of the most important 
aspects of product differentiation are non-technical: they involve pricing, creating 
appealing bundles of products, and other elements of marketing strategies. An NSA 
does not change the possibility and/or incentive of the operators to differentiate from 
a commercial perspective, nor a core-related technical perspective. Non-core 
technical differentiation is the only area where the NSA may have an impact. 
3. RAN sharing typically affects coverage and other technical quality parameters 
attached to it in a positive way. A difference in coverage, for example, means a 
difference in the availability and quality of signals at different locations. However, 
there is a maximum level of coverage for a given technical threshold of quality, above 
which no differentiation can exist in this parameter. The closer an operator is to this 
maximum the better for its customers: improving coverage increases the value of the 
service to all of them. An NSA will result in greater similarity in coverage between the 
participating operators, but at a higher level than in the standalone scenario. 
Therefore, coverage is an important differentiator only if there is a shortage of it, not 
when it is abundant.29 This argument can be made for other technical parameters, 
too, like capacity, although not identically: as opposed to coverage, capacity is less 
dependent on the NSA.30 
4. Some competition authorities have investigated the possibility that RAN sharing also 
constrains the operators in their choice of technology, capacity enhancement and the 
                                                        
29 Even under an NSA, the options and incentives to differentiate in coverage and capacity remain, 
especially to business customers with special coverage and capacity needs. 
30 For capacity, there is a loss of differentiation as a result of the common antennae technology. But 
capacity also depends on the type of active sharing and whether spectrum is shared or not. In the 
case of MORAN each party uses its own spectrum with all the possibilities for differentiation it 
allows, and even with MOCN, when the similarity is higher, the capacity can be scheduled based on 
predefined principles in case of congestion, which means that ways to differentiate still remain. 
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introduction of technical innovations.31 This rests on the argument that in an NSA, 
future investments must be coordinated, and there is less freedom in introducing any 
innovation unilaterally.  
However, in the assessment of this issue the depth of the agreement is a crucial factor. 
In the case of MORAN, spectrum use, carrier aggregation, and the introduction of 
new technologies and switching off old ones can all be implemented unilaterally and 
therefore any loss in differentiation is considerably smaller. 
Furthermore, technical innovation itself is not predominantly driven by operators, 
but by equipment manufacturers, who then sell the more advanced equipment to 
operators when they next need or wish to replace theirs. Active equipment has a 
lifespan of a few years, and therefore innovations will be introduced within a 
relatively short time span irrespective of the NSA. Initially, the NSA may even speed 
up the adoption of new technologies as operators consolidate their network.32  
In our view, the issue of lost differentiation will always be one of the main topics 
investigated in connection to NSAs. The burden of proof for substantiating whether there is a 
substantial decrease in differentiation compared to the counterfactual and that it is large 
enough to harm consumers is on the authority, and this task it is not at all easy from an 
analytical point of view. 
4.1.2 The decrease in incentives to compete due to fixed costs becoming variable 
One of the effects of a network sharing agreement is that some parts of the network costs that 
individual operators bear become shared costs that need to be split between the operators in 
a way that they deem fair. The design of the system for sharing these costs may give rise to 
possible unilateral concerns, if the nature of costs changes.33 Depending on the specifics of 
the NSA, costs that were previously fixed may sometimes become variable (i.e. dependent on 
usage), which could change the pricing incentives of the operators, and therefore their 
incentives to compete.  
When a network is already built and has large enough capacities, network costs are 
largely fixed,34 therefore the operator’s incentive is to attract as many consumers, as much 
usage as possible, to exploit the economies of scale. However, if the network is shared, these 
                                                        
31 See BIPT (2012), L’Autorité de la Concurrence (2013) and the Danish case 4/0120-0402-0057 
between Telia/Telenor (decision taken in 2012). The latter can be downloaded: 
https://www.kfst.dk/media/13407/20120229-afgoerelse-anmeldelse-af-netdelingssamarbejde-
mellem-telia-og-telenor.pdf 
32 If not all operators are involved in the NSA (as is almost all known cases), the competitive pressure 
coming from alternative operators to modernise the network would ensure that it is done in a 
timely manner. Keeping equipment beyond its lifespan also generates extra costs in itself. 
33 The increase in cost commonality can also lead to possible coordinative concerns that we will deal 
with in the assigned section. 
34 This is evident for CAPEX, but also true for most of the OPEX.  
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fixed costs must be split between the operators based on some metric. One intuitive metric is 
usage: it appears to make sense that an operator pays a larger proportion of the shared 
network costs if its consumers use it more. However, this sharing rule also means that (at 
least part of) the network costs become variable. As a consequence, operators are now less 
incentivised towards increasing usage (and therefore the network cost they have to pay), next 
to their original, scale-based incentive to increase it. Since attracting consumers is a key 
parameter of competition, the operators’ incentives to compete decrease. 
This is a concern with an easy fix from a competition point of view: fixed costs must 
remain fixed, and shared according to some pre-agreed, non-variable system, instead of 
becoming usage-based; this way, the incentive to compete is preserved.35 
4.2 COORDINATIVE HORIZONTAL EFFECTS 
Before going into the two, specific coordinative-type concerns that may arise when evaluating 
NSAs, we look at how coordinative effects are investigated in general. The central question 
when analysing coordinative effects is whether the parties and their competitors’ ability and 
incentive to tacitly collude changes due to the agreement (in contrast to their individual 
ability and incentive to compete, as with unilateral effects).  The usual argument would be 
that if parties become more similar to each other in certain key aspects of competition, then 
this could possibly lead to tacit cooperation between all market players to the detriment of 
consumers – for example, through increasing prices, delaying innovations, decreasing 
quality, etc.  
As a first, but not conclusive step, coordinative effects are usually assessed based on the 
so-called Airtours criteria, originally developed for mergers, but now also referenced in the 
case of horizontal agreements.36 For coordination to be sustainable, the following conditions 
must apply.  
1. Ability to coordinate: it must be relatively simple for parties to reach a common 
understanding of the terms of coordination.  
2. Transparency: the coordinating firms must be able to monitor to a sufficient degree 
whether the terms of coordination are being adhered to. 
3. Deterrence: discipline requires that there be some form of credible mechanism for 
punishment that can be activated if deviation is detected. 
                                                        
35 In practice there may be some cases (typically in an MOCN setting), when parties and their 
activities are asymmetric, market positions evolve differently, and the fixed cost sharing agreement 
seems less equitable especially as time advances; but even in such a case, there are many ways to 
incorporate these changes into the agreement without resorting to a usage-based system (such as 
using a fair scheduler in congested periods, or paying lump-sum transfers for the larger capacity 
share).  
36 European Commission (2011), paragraphs 66-68. and European Commission (2004b), paragraph 
41. The actual Airtours criteria are points 2-4; the first point is often implicitly assumed. 
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4. No “maverick”:  the reactions of outsiders, such as current and future competitors not 
participating in the coordination, as well as customers, should not be able to 
jeopardise the results expected from the coordination. 
In light of these criteria, it is worth considering whether the retail market for mobile 
telecommunications is especially prone to coordination in general. For each condition listed 
above, we list a few general factors to take into account. 
1. Ability to coordinate: mobile telecommunication markets are dynamic and fast-
changing; and mobile services are highly differentiated products – these properties 
can heavily undermine the ability to coordinate. On the other hand, mobile markets 
usually have few, large operators who pay close attention to each other’s actions – 
these factors increase the ability to coordinate. 
2. Transparency: the very wide and varied product portfolios of MNOs make it difficult 
to determine an operator’s strategy, which goes against transparency. However, there 
may be a regulator or a similar body on the market that collects and publishes data on 
the market (albeit usually only in some aggregate form), increasing transparency. 
3. Deterrence: product differentiation and a possible lack of transparency makes any 
punishment mechanism difficult to design and implement, although the possibility 
cannot be discounted.  
4. No “maverick”: on many national markets, certain operators follow a very different 
market strategy from the others and therefore might be considered a factor 
destabilising any potential collusion. The best candidates can be recent or aspiring 
entrants or stronger MVNOs.  
Overall, the mobile telecommunications market does not appear especially prone to 
coordination, but the specifics of both the market in question and the design of the NSA 
under investigation do matter.  
Second, it needs to be assessed whether the NSA itself changes the existing situation 
enough to enable coordination or make it more efficient.  
We now look at the two specific coordinative concerns that NSAs may give rise to. These 
are mentioned as two general mechanisms in the Horizontal Guidelines where coordinated 
effects might arise, and both of these issues have actually appeared in the assessment of 
NSAs. 
4.2.1 The increase in cost commonality 
The Horizontal Guidelines specifically mention this possible concern with production 
agreements: if parties have market power, the parties’ commonality of costs, that is, the 
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proportion to variable costs which the parties have in common, may increase to a level which 
enables them to collude. 37 
The Horizontal Guidelines refer specifically to variable costs, as opposed to fixed costs, 
when discussing cost commonality. To put it simply, this is because economic theory shows 
that fixed costs do not influence pricing. It is important to discuss, however, what fixed and 
variable costs really mean in this sector. The difference between the two concepts is a 
question of the relevant time frame: many fixed costs are variable if the horizon is long 
enough. The majority of network costs that telecommunications operators face would 
normally be considered fixed; in reality, they are variable in the long run. In a dynamic 
context, an industry has to recover fixed costs (and a return on them) in order to be 
sustainable and attract capital for financing the necessary future developments. It is evident 
that in industries with high fixed and low marginal costs, marginal cost pricing is not 
realistic. If these short run quasi-fixed costs are also considered, this concern appears more 
serious.38 
The effects of this potential theory of harm must be assessed at the retail level, while the 
commonality of costs increases only at the network level.39 This means that several costly 
processes of providing retail mobile services (marketing, sales, billing etc) are unaffected. 
Examples of costs that may become common include: costs relating to the passive 
infrastructure behind the parties’ networks, costs relating to maintaining the parties’ 
networks, costs relating to spectrum.  As only network costs are affected, even full network 
consolidation would result in less than half of total mobile service production and provision 
costs becoming common.40 Unfortunately, no safe harbour is given: neither the guidelines, 
nor established case law give any threshold on cost commonality below which this specific 
coordinative concern cannot be raised.  
We should note that some degree of increase in cost commonality is inevitable in all 
NSAs. The challenge to the parties of the NSA is to minimise it, while maintaining the 
economic rationale of the agreement. The degree to which cost commonality increases 
essentially depends on two factors. 
1. The scope of the agreement: as an example, spectrum costs do not become common in 
a MORAN setting, but may become so (to some extent, at least) in an MOCN setting 
                                                        
37 European Commission (2011), paragraphs 176-180.  
38 The Danish case 4/0120-0402-0057 between Telia/Telenor took fixed costs into account when 
calculating common costs.  
39 Again, the Horizontal Guidelines (European Commission 2011) specifically prescribe evaluating 
the retail market, but in the Danish case 4/0120-0402-0057 between Telia/Telenor the 
competition authority also looked at the upstream level, where shared costs constitute a much 
greater proportion of overall costs.  
40 A study prepared by the GSMA on comparing the cost structures of mobile and fixed 
telecommunications services states that network cost is around 30% of an MNO’s total cost. See 
GSMA (2012b). 
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or any deeper level of agreement. Similarly, the scope of the NSA with regard to 
technologies (2G, 3G, 4G) also influences cost commonality.  
2. The cost sharing system: as discussed in 4.1.2, parties must decide how to share costs 
among each other; how much each should pay for shared items. The metric they use 
to determine this can also be important in this case: if previously (debatably) fixed 
costs are shared based on usage, they become undeniably variable, and increase 
variable cost commonality.  
Overall, the severity of this concern depends foremost on the scope of the NSA: while the 
careful design of the parties’ cost sharing system may mitigate it if the analysis focuses 
strictly on variable costs, it is quite possible that fixed costs will also be considered.  
4.2.2 Information exchange 
An NSA necessitates some degree of information exchange, both during its initial design and 
also later in its operation and decision-making regarding expansion and further 
developments. However, there is a potential competitive concern that sharing information 
between competitors can facilitate a collusive outcome, or make it more stable, especially by 
increasing market transparency.41 When evaluating the possible effects of information 
exchange in a production agreement such as an NSA, one must weigh this concern against 
the need for information sharing to make the NSA work efficiently.  
Overall, the assessment of information exchange agreements is still a developing and 
much-debated area in competition policy. In the Horizontal Guidelines a "more economic 
approach" is outlined in general, but these assessment criteria have not yet been applied and 
discussed in a publicly available decision, so it is very hard to make accurate statements 
about where the border between procompetitive and anticompetitive information exchange 
may lie. 
A key principle in competition policy is that the amount and scope of information 
exchange should be kept at the lowest level necessary to the functioning of the agreement. 
Further, the nature of the information shared matters greatly, and the Horizontal Guidelines 
lay down a few rules of thumb regarding the assessment. For example, the information 
exchange has less chance to be considered harmful if the information in question is in more 
aggregated form, if it refers to older data (and certainly not to the future) and if it is shared 
more rarely. 
There are two areas where information between parties must be exchanged in an NSA. 
Firstly, the shared network must be planned, developed and then operated. Secondly, the 
parties must have a system in place to settle accounts with each other; the metrics on which 
                                                        
41 European Commission (2011), Chapter 2.  
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these accounts are based must be shared. It is only information exchanges between 
competitors of individualised data regarding intended future prices or quantities that is 
considered a restriction of competition by object;42 no such data is needed to operate a shared 
network.  
This means that the need for information sharing might be a legitimate concern, but it 
does not prohibit the existence of NSAs completely. But to handle this issue, the scope of the 
information exchanged must be minimised, and the type of information shared must be 
restricted as well as the group of people with access to it (the parties may establish a “clean 
team”, for example, or form a joint venture to manage, operate and develop the joint 
network).  
4.3 VERTICAL EFFECTS 
All vertical effects emerging in connection to NSAs are connected to access. Competitors 
usually seek access to the relevant upstream level in order to be able to provide their 
downstream services. The question is whether the NSA would have the effect of changing the 
ability and/or the incentive of any party involved in the NSA to make access to an element of 
its mobile network infrastructure or services impossible or more expensive for its 
competitors at the given vertical level (this is called foreclosure or raising rivals’ costs). The 
levels in question define the concerns discussed; we will look at, in turn, access to passive 
infrastructure to competitors, and access to active infrastructure or services (like wholesale 
gateway access to MVNEs or full MVNOs with their own core network, and wholesale access 
to the core to less than full MVNOs).  
Vertical effects should be analysed in the framework of ability, incentive and effect to 
foreclose, developed originally in the framework for assessing non-horizontal mergers.43 We 
first list some arguments that need to be considered in general. 
1. Ability: in order for the parties to have the ability to foreclose, the upstream service 
must be an important input to the competitors seeking access, and the parties must 
have significant market power on the upstream market – implying that competitors 
have no (economically rational) alternative to dealing with the parties.   
In the context of NSAs, even if some decrease in the capacity offered to access seekers 
by any of the parties could occur as a result, for all services in question, there still 
remain some bypass opportunities. Moreover, as the variable cost of providing access 
is negligible, if there are no capacity constraints, they are rightly assumed to be 
incentivised to do so. 
                                                        
42 European Commission (2011), paragraphs 73-74. 
43 See European Commission (2008).  
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2. Incentive: foreclosure or raising rivals’ costs entails some loss of profit for the parties 
to the NSA at the upstream level; the incentive to foreclose exists if this profit loss is 
more than compensated for in the downstream market, where competition is harmed.  
Because of the available alternative opportunities, NSA parties would have a hard 
time gaining downstream customers via foreclosing strategies, and therefore the 
profit loss upstream would likely disincentivise them from doing so. 
3. Effect: the foreclosure must have a demonstrable and substantive negative effect on 
final consumers.  
Concerning NSAs, the cost of using a particular input on the respective upstream 
market is usually low compared to the total cost of providing the mobile service to 
customers on the downstream market. Therefore, in order to trigger a significant 
downstream price increase, rivals' access costs should increase (not just through the 
parties' behaviour, but also through alternative means) substantially. One should 
carefully evaluate, especially in the light of a given regulatory environment, whether 
such a substantial change of access costs would be likely – usually it would not. 
Any of the conditions is hard to satisfy, and even more so cumulatively. In some specific 
cases, as we discuss below, these concerns may be valid. However, even if a competition 
authority can really substantiate a vertical theory of harm, usually the parties can easily offer 
commitments to alleviate these concerns. 
4.3.1 Access to passive infrastructure 
As NSA parties consolidate their networks, they may leave or demolish facilities (towers, 
antenna locations and other elements of passive infrastructure) that their competitors also 
use. The theoretical concern is that this could negatively affect competitors as they must seek, 
build, raise new facilities; and through a possible (if temporary) adverse effect on coverage, 
also final consumers. The concern is potentially more relevant if the NSA results in a greater 
change (reduction) in the number and location of facilities.44 
On top of the general arguments raised on the ability-incentive-effect triad of foreclosure, 
some additional elements need to be considered. First, in terms of passive infrastructure still 
there remain alternative ways to get this type access from players other than the MNOs, as 
substitute antenna locations could be available from entities not even present on the 
telecommunications markets (for example high rooftops, electric towers, etc.), which would 
make the ability to foreclose less likely to prevail. Second, the cost of site rental alone is quite 
                                                        
44 For example, if one of the parties shared a very large proportion of its own infrastructure with 
competitors before the NSA, and after the NSA many of these facilities will be demolished. 
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small compared to the whole cost of providing downstream service, which makes significant 
downstream effects unlikely. 
This concern was investigated in the Danish case, but was settled by the parties offering 
commitments, specifically to offer abandoned facilities to competitors to buy or rent; and 
seeking approval to demolish facilities.45 Although these types of remedies may not be 
necessary, they cannot be especially onerous from the NSA parties’ point of view and may 
even coincide with their business interests.  
4.3.2 Access to wholesale mobile services to MVNOs 
The classic foreclosure argument is that the NSA may lead to the parties’ increasing market 
power on the relevant upstream level, increasing their ability and incentive to foreclose 
MVNOs: refuse, limit or overprice their access to wholesale services.46 
Network access is of course a key input for all types of MVNOs, and the supply of possible 
providers is limited even without NSAs. This means that these concerns may seem more 
crucial than access to passive infrastructure. However, only the number of truly independent 
networks decreases as a result of the NSA, not the number of independent MNO access 
providers. Therefore, the bargaining position of an MVNO is not necessarily expected to 
change. This concern may arise more acutely if the parties to the NSA have previously 
provided access to MVNOs, and their free capacities are projected to decrease significantly 
under the NSA, compared to the standalone option. However, even if this were the case the 
concern would be weak at best if the parties had strong, viable competitors with significant 
free capacities who could cater to MVNOs. 
On top of the general arguments on ability, incentive and effect listed before, what is 
really important to consider is whether the incentives to provide MVNO access will be 
impacted by the NSA. Usually, in the case of abundant capacity, providing access will still 
remain a straightforward way for MNOs to economise on their large, quasi-fixed network 
costs.  
4.4 UNFAIR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
Finally, we mention a type of concern that we believe is not a standard one in modern 
competition policy, based on the potential exclusionary effect of an NSA, either at the retail 
level or in connection to spectrum allocation.47 
The issue raised is that the parties to the NSA might gain a non-replicable cost and /or 
quality advantage, which may create a competitive advantage. According to the concern, the 
                                                        
45 See case 4/0120-0402-0057 between Telia/Telenor. 
46 Other, closely related concerns may be that MVNOs have less choice (fewer distinct networks to 
choose from), or that there will be less free capacity on the market for MVNOs (as NSA parties 
optimise their shared network).  
47 It is mentioned in OECD (2014), p. 68. as well as in BEREC (2018). 
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decreased relative competitiveness of other operators could lead to the competitors’ exit or 
serious weakening, thereby decreasing competition, and allowing the remaining players to 
abuse their increased market power. 
4.4.1 Potential exclusion of operators not party to the NSA 
This theory of harm is often raised by operators who have been “left out” of the planned NSA 
in question: they posit that their competitiveness on the retail market will suffer due to the 
NSA. This points to its essential weakness: since a competition authority should protect 
competition, not competitors, the fact that competitors may not be able to keep up with the 
NSA parties in some way is not in itself an argument against the NSA, as there is no 
consumer harm. If a competitor left the market, it may lead to consumer harm; but, as we 
briefly discuss below, this seems highly unlikely and would be almost impossible to prove. 
The concern is similar to that of predatory pricing and shares the same problem of 
credibility. The potential cost advantage of the parties to the NSA is real, though it might be 
replicable by others (especially if they could also become part of an alternative NSA). But 
stating that it results in the elimination or substantial weakening of the competitors and after 
that, the abuse of market power is extreme. Even significant cost and quality advantages can 
be offset with differentiation or other strategic moves on the market. The complete 
elimination scenario is dubious, especially considering the market structure of most mobile 
telecommunications markets, with few, large, integrated players, but the main effect of this 
concern, the abuse of market power, is conditional on this elimination actually happening. 
Considering the extremely high burden of proof, it is not very likely that a competition 
authority could substantiate such a concern. We only know of one instance when it was 
investigated: the Czech telecommunications regulator prepared an assessment of the network 
sharing on the Czech market and evaluated this concern on the three-player Czech mobile 
market but concluded that no exclusionary risk could be substantiated.48 
4.4.2 The excessive concentration of spectrum 
A network sharing agreement, in the case of MOCN or any deeper level of agreement, affects 
the utilisation of spectrum by operators on the market – specifically, the parties to the NSA 
can use their spectrum more efficiently by sharing it. Depending on the way spectrum is 
allocated, the parties may pool a significant amount of spectrum, which may lead to a 
competitive advantage. But this spectrum pooling may appear similar to spectrum 
concentration and a not especially well-founded concern can be based on this notion.  
The argument can be that the amount of available spectrum affects network capacity and 
speed, therefore if the parties to the NSA have a significantly larger amount of spectrum at 
                                                        
48 See Český telekomunikační úřad (2015). 
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their joint disposal than their competitors, the competitors may be unable to offer services of 
comparable quality. We believe this argument to be problematic for several reasons; however, 
it has come up in real-world cases.49 Here are a couple of counter-arguments with respect to 
this concern, which mostly run parallel with those presented in the previous section, in 
relation to possible exclusionary effects on the retail market. 
 If the agreement is in the form of a MORAN, no spectrum pooling occurs, therefore 
this concern can be automatically discarded.  
 Spectrum endowments are usually asymmetric due to the endogenous allocation of 
spectrum rights. These asymmetries result in capacity and quality differences between 
operators and their service capabilities. Network sharing with spectrum pooling can 
enable the more efficient use of the spectrum.50 Provided that the parties remain 
independent actors on the market in the relevant features of their services, apart from 
RAN- and spectrum-related ones, it could only raise a potential competition concern 
if it changed the ability and incentives of the parties to compete on the retail (or 
wholesale) markets.  
 The fact that competitors may not be able to keep up with the NSA parties’ superior 
offers due to the use of pooled spectrum is not in itself an argument against the NSA – 
consumer harm cannot be automatically assumed. Harm would only manifest if 
competitors were forced to leave the market or their ability to compete were 
significantly reduced due to the NSA.  
While the spectrum concern shares many features with the previously discussed 
exclusionary concern, the affected markets differ. Spectrum is allocated, and after a given 
number of years, re-allocated through various award mechanisms, such as auctions. The 
positions of the MNOs can therefore be much less stable in the long run with regard to 
spectrum endowment than on the retail market. If previous spectrum awarding processes 
have resulted in a very asymmetric situation (to the advantage of NSA members), and the 
next award opportunity is further away in time, or if the allocation mechanism is designed 
poorly, this concern may carry some water. The message is, however, that the root of the 
problem – and thus also its solution, lies in the design of the spectrum awarding procedures, 
and not the NSAs.  
In the Danish case where this concern was seriously considered, the competition 
authority found that a commitment requiring the NSA parties to participate together in the 
                                                        
49 In the Danish case 4/0120-0402-0057, Telia and Telenor established a joint venture for their 
MOCN network sharing agreement. The spectrum was pooled and handed over to the jointly owned 
TT Network. 
50 See for example BIPT (2012) on the advantages and the differentiation under spectrum pooling.  
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relevant spectrum awarding procedures would be necessary to alleviate this concern.51 While 
the remedy directly mitigates the concern in hand, it would also increase the proportion of 
costs that become common, increasing the likelihood of coordinative concerns. Furthermore, 
it could also disadvantage the parties and indirectly the customers as the operators may not 
be able to acquire enough capacity to properly serve their respective customer bases due to 
caps on the amount of spectrum they can jointly purchase.  
5. EVALUATING NSAS’ EFFICIENCY BENEFITS 
If competitive concerns are substantiated in the case of an NSA, the next step is to assess the 
possible benefits, efficiencies resulting from it: the negative effects must be weighed against 
the positive ones. In this chapter, we discuss the framework in which efficiencies are analysed 
in a competitive assessment and list some examples of the specific types of efficiencies that 
may arise in connection to NSAs. Although the efficiencies are crucial to the assessment of 
any NSA, they depend very much on the specific form of it takes. Therefore, this discussion of 
efficiencies is shorter and more general than the previous chapter on possible theories of 
harm. 
The issue of countervailing efficiencies is dealt with in the third paragraph of Article 101. 
The paragraph lays out the conditions under which the agreement may be exempt from the 
prohibitions in Article 101(1), which we discussed in the previous chapter.52 These are the 
following: 
1. The agreement must contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods 
or to promoting technical or economic progress. 
2. Consumers must be allowed a fair share of the resulting benefit. 
3. The agreement must be indispensable to achieve these efficiencies. 
4. The agreement must not result in the possibility of eliminating competition in 
respect of a substantial part of the products (services) in question. 
The first condition essentially states that efficiencies must result from the agreement, 
while the second stipulates that the efficiencies must not only benefit the NSA parties, but 
must be passed on to consumers. The third, indispensability condition implies that the 
agreement cannot be exempt if there is another, less restrictive way to achieve the efficiencies 
                                                        
51 See case 4/0120-0402-0057 (Telia/Telenor). The parties did state that their agreement relied on a 
presumption of mutual bidding, ruling out the alternative of bidding individually and then 
combining the relevant spectrum for joint use (a basis for the concern), but the Danish authority 
still found commitments more reassuring and thus necessary.  
52 There is also a detailed guideline available on the assessment of efficiencies (European 
Commission 2004a).  
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in question. The fourth condition means that no efficiencies are desirable enough to outweigh 
the total elimination of competition.  
The burden of proof for showing that all four, cumulative conditions are met is on the 
NSA parties; while the competition authority must show harm, it is the parties who must 
demonstrate efficiencies.  
It might seem that the central question, is whether the first two, interconnected 
conditions are met (efficiencies and resulting consumer benefits). However, the evaluation of 
the third condition can be tricky as well, since in order to show indispensability one needs to 
compare it with another rationally available option and argue that the second one does not 
produce a comparable level of efficiencies with less harm – this question can be crucial when 
designing the NSA. The fourth condition is usually simple to see: competition is not 
eliminated. 
Two main types of efficiencies may arise in NSAs: 
1. Cost efficiencies: cost savings resulting from the agreement which translate into 
lower prices (or similar benefits) to consumers. These can and should be quantified.  
2. Qualitative efficiencies: the quality of services (such as coverage, speed or reliability) 
may improve for some or all consumers, or certain improvements (such as new 
technologies) may reach consumers sooner than they would have absent the 
agreement. These efficiencies are often not quantifiable, or their quantitative 
assessment is not trivial.53 
Let us first discuss cost efficiencies. The main advantages of an NSA, to the parties at 
least, are the CAPEX and OPEX savings it results in. These can be calculated from comparing 
so-called business cases, as a difference of net cost in standalone scenario (the 
counterfactual) and the net cost with the agreement. But only part of these savings need to be 
considered: the part that is passed on to customers in the form of a general price decrease, a 
device subsidy, a subsidised additional service, etc. In order to judge the case, we need to 
know the pass-through rate, and a plausible mechanism for transferring the savings to the 
customers. This complex setting means that even for these more quantifiable efficiencies, the 
calculation is less than trivial.  
The positive effects of the agreement on consumers may arise in many forms apart from 
the simple monetary advantage. Most of these can be classified as improvements in quality, 
leading to the enhancement or increased value of the service, or the earlier availability of 
                                                        
53 Pedrós et al (2017), a paper published by GSMA, provides an interesting new approach in the 
assesment of qualitative efficiencies in the Austrian Hutchison/Orange merger.  
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these improvements than in the counterfactual scenario. These are qualitative efficiencies, 
the most common of which are the following:  
 better indoor or outdoor network coverage (due to more sites, or a larger covered 
territory), 
 better network and signal quality (due to denser networks, better locations, an 
enhanced and more efficient RAN, etc.), 
 higher up- and download speed and higher throughput (in the case of an MOCN 
agreement), 
 faster network rollout, 
 earlier availability of coverage and services than absent the agreement, 
 earlier fulfilment of coverage and quality commitments than otherwise.  
Some advantages are temporary, others are permanent by nature. These qualitative 
efficiencies also have to be assessed compared to the counterfactual: the (future) situation 
without the agreement, and should be quantified as much as possible. This is especially 
important as these efficiencies taken together may be larger and more important than those 
passed through in the form of price decreases.54 
6. CONCLUSION 
Network sharing agreements have become increasingly widespread in mobile 
telecommunications markets, creating an assessment challenge for regulatory agencies and 
competition authorities. Our paper presents a framework for the competitive assessment of 
NSAs, detailing the principles of evaluating possible concerns and counterbalancing 
efficiency benefits. 
While NSAs sometimes bring considerable change on the market, their impact is 
significantly smaller on the final consumer than that of a merger, as many of the benefits are 
delivered with less potential for harm. Our approach emphasises that not all NSAs are 
created equal: the assessment of the balance of harm and benefits to customers due to an 
NSA is a complex endeavour, and a lot depends on the specifics of the agreement. We also 
find that for most theories of harm, the likelihood of an adverse effect on the consumers 
increases (but not always significantly) with the depth of the agreement, from MORAN to 
MOCN and onwards. 
As mobile technologies and services continue to develop and new technologies requiring 
high investment emerge the mobile telecommunications industry is in desperate need of cost 
reductions. As consolidation is mostly discouraged by competition authorities, network 
                                                        
54 This is mentioned explicitly in the Horizontal Guidelines (European Commission 2011), paragraph 
69. 
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sharing can be a path towards eliminating the possibly unnecessary duplication of networks, 
or towards decreasing cost whenever possible. Understanding the complex issue of NSAs will 
be a key to supporting further market progress while preserving effective and sustainable 
competition. 
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